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Abstract 
 
This series of studies addresses the question of why some people believe in phenomena 
such as horoscopes, telepathy, and omens, while others find them utterly unbelievable. 
The cognitive factors that explain belief in paranormal, superstitious, magical, and 
supernatural (PSMS) phenomena have been studied from a variety of perspectives, but 
consistent support for the theories and a deeper understanding of the nature of these 
beliefs have been missing. The present thesis argues that groundbreaking findings are 
unlikely as long as explanations are sought in domain-general cognitive deficits or in 
other domain-general factors.  
In the present thesis, a review of definitions and assessment methods of PSMS 
beliefs found that these beliefs can best be encompassed and distinguished from other 
unfounded beliefs by defining them as core knowledge confusions in which the basic 
attributes of mental phenomena, material objects, living, and animate organisms, and 
the processes these engage in, are applied outside their proper domains. Four empirical 
studies tested predictions derived from this definition and from dual-process theories of 
thinking. In support of the predictions, accepting core knowledge confusion statements 
was related to both traditional PSMS beliefs, such as beliefs in extra-sensory perception 
and witches, as well as to PSMS beliefs that are not typically included in assessments, 
such as the belief that random events occur for a purpose. Ontologically confused 
conceptions of energy were discovered to be present even in upper secondary school 
students and they were found seemingly resistant to an instructional intervention.  
In line with the notion that the basis of PSMS beliefs lies in biases in intuitive 
processing, the beliefs and core knowledge confusions were more common among those 
people who had an intuitive thinking style, and asking people to respond quickly 
increased their acceptance of the confusions. Given that theoretical arguments and 
previous findings indicate that analytical thinking restrains intuitive biases, it is 
surprising that previous studies have shown inconsistent findings regarding the relation 
of an analytical thinking style to PSMS beliefs. The present studies showed that such a 
relationship can indeed be found if the style is conceptualized as a striving for reflective 
thinking and measured accordingly. Finally, behavioral and brain imaging evidence 
converged to indicate that skepticism was related to stronger cognitive inhibition. By 
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focusing on the interplay of intuitive and reflective processes and cognitive inhibition, 
the present approach makes it possible to better understand individual differences in the 
beliefs. 
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Tiivistelmä 
 
Tässä tutkimussarjassa tutkittiin, miksi jotkut ihmiset uskovat esimerkiksi astrologiaan, 
henkiin ja enteisiin toisten pitäessä niitä täysin epäuskottavina. Paranormaaleja, 
taikauskoisia, maagisia ja yliluonnollisia (PTMY-) uskomuksia selittäviä ajatteluun 
liittyviä tekijöitä on tutkittu useasta näkökulmasta, mutta näitä uskomuksia koskevia 
teorioita ei ole kyetty todentamaan, eikä uskomusten syvempää olemusta ole kyetty 
selittämään. Väitöskirjassa ehdotetaan, ettei läpimurto ole todennäköinen niin kauan 
kuin selityksiä etsitään aihepiiristä riippumattomista ajattelun heikkouksista tai muista 
yleisistä tekijöistä.  
Ensimmäinen osatyö on katsaus PTMY-uskomusten määritelmiin ja 
arviointimenetelmiin. Katsauksen perusteella kaikki nämä uskomukset pystytään 
parhaiten kattamaan ja samalla erottamaan muista heikosti perustelluista uskomuksista 
määrittelemällä ne sekaannuksiksi, joissa psyykkisten ilmiöiden, aineellisten 
kappaleiden, elollisten ja ajattelevien olentojen sekä näitä koskevien prosessien 
ydinominaisuudet ulotetaan asianmukaisten kategorioidensa ulkopuolelle. Tästä 
määritelmästä sekä tiedon kaksoisprosessointiteorioista johdettuja hypoteeseja testattiin 
neljässä empiirisessä osatutkimuksessa. Tulosten mukaan sekaannusta sisältävien 
ydintietoväittämien hyväksyminen oli yhteydessä sekä perinteisiin paranormaaleihin 
uskomuksiin (kuten telepatiaan ja noitiin) että sellaisiin PTMY-uskomuksiin, jotka eivät 
yleensä ole sisältyneet uskomusten arviointimenetelmiin (kuten uskoon satunnaisten 
tapahtumien tarkoituksellisuudesta). Energiaan liittyviä ydintiedon sekaannuksia 
tutkittiin myös lukiolaisilla. Vaikutti siltä, ettei sekaannuksiin ole helppoa vaikuttaa 
opetuksen keinoin.  
PTMY-uskomukset ja ydintiedon sekaannukset olivat yleisempiä niillä, joilla on 
intuitiivisempi ajattelutyyli. Myös vastausajan rajoittaminen lisäsi ydintietoväittämien 
hyväksymistä. Tulokset tukevat ajatusta, että uskomukset kumpuavat intuitiivisen 
ajattelun vinoumista. Koska sekä teoria että aiempi tutkimus puoltavat käsitystä, että 
analyyttinen ajattelu hillitsee intuitiivisia vinoumia, on yllättävää, ettei analyyttinen 
ajattelutyyli ole aiemmissa tutkimuksissa ollut johdonmukaisesti yhteydessä PTMY-
uskomuksiin. Väitöskirjassa osoitettiin, että yhteys löytyy, jos analyyttinen tyyli 
käsitteellistetään pyrkimykseksi reflektiiviseen ajatteluun, ja jos sen arvioimiseen 
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käytetään asianmukaisia menetelmiä. Viimeinen löydös oli että sekä neuropsykologinen 
testi että aivokuvantamistulokset tukivat olettamusta skeptisyyden lisääntymisestä 
vahvan kognitiivisen inhibition myötä. Tällainen lähestymistapa, jossa tutkitaan 
intuitiivisten ja reflektiivisten prosessien sekä kognitiivisen inhibition välisiä suhteita, 
antaa aiempaa paremmat lähtökohdat ymmärtää yksilöllisiä eroja PTMY-uskomuksissa. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Paranormal, superstitious, magical, and supernatural beliefs are psychologically 
puzzling phenomena. Most people read their horoscopes, but nevertheless feel the need 
to excuse themselves by mentioning that they do not really believe in them. Many seek 
alternative treatments outside of medicine for their illnesses, even though the concepts 
underlying these treatments, such as healing energy, are entirely foreign to science. 
Some people are even ready to believe that their deceased loved ones are sending them 
messages from the other side through a medium. Indeed, surveys on paranormal, 
superstitious, magical, and supernatural beliefs consistently indicate that a substantial 
part of the population holds these beliefs. For example, a recent Eurobarometer poll 
found that 37% of Europeans believe in lucky numbers (European Commission, 2010). 
For psychological researchers, these beliefs have presented a conundrum for two 
main reasons. First, the field has not established consensus on a definition of what 
constitutes a belief that is paranormal, superstitious, magical, or supernatural (for short: 
PSMS belief). For instance, is the belief in communication through a medium a 
paranormal belief or a magical belief? What is the difference? What about a belief in 
UFOs and aliens? No clear criteria for addressing these questions have been presented 
in the research literature, and thus the proposed explanations have been fragmentary.  
Second, despite decades of research on the determinants of belief, few clear and 
replicable patterns have emerged in the results. Research has focused on factors such as 
demographics, education, general and specific cognitive abilities, personality, needs, 
and values (reviews: Irwin, 2009; Vyse, 1997). Nonetheless, many of the findings have 
been inconsistent. For example, analytical thinking has been found to be positively 
related, negatively related, or unrelated to PSMS beliefs (references in Paper IV). 
In the last years, advances in developmental psychology and dual-process theories of 
cognition have inspired a new approach to studying these beliefs. In this approach, the 
explanation for PSMS beliefs is sought in the conceptual contents of the beliefs 
themselves. With this, the perspective has shifted somewhat, from viewing the beliefs as 
a general aberration in want of an explanation, to considering them as being rooted in 
specific cognitive biases shared by all normally functioning human beings.  
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The present thesis consists of a set of papers that explore PSMS beliefs in light of 
this new perspective. Specifically, this thesis continues the work on formulating and 
testing the definition of PSMS beliefs as involving confusions of the core properties of 
mental phenomena, material objects, living, and animate organisms, and the processes 
these engage in, which was initially proposed by Lindeman and Aarnio (2007). The first 
paper in this thesis is a review of definitions and assessment methods in an attempt to 
determine whether there is reason to separate the concepts of paranormal, superstitious, 
magical and supernatural beliefs, or whether they can all be subsumed under this 
definition, and to determine how they differ from other beliefs. The four subsequent 
papers are empirical and test predictions derived from this definition.  
The present studies investigate the beliefs in relation to dual-process theories of 
thinking. The observation that in people’s minds, PSMS beliefs co-exist with scientific 
conceptions, as well as previous findings linking the beliefs to an intuitive thinking 
style, suggest that these beliefs originate in intuitive processing. Thus, the present thesis 
investigates the interplay of intuitive and analytical cognitive processes and cognitive 
inhibition in regulating how the beliefs are manifested. In short, the present thesis 
examines the two main unresolved questions concerning PSMS beliefs: What are these 
beliefs, and why do so many believe in them while others do not? 
 
1.1 The cognitive basis of PSMS beliefs 
1.1.1 The cognitive deficits hypothesis 
Much of the cognitive research on PSMS beliefs has investigated whether belief is 
connected to lower reasoning capacity. Some studies have reported that general 
intelligence is negatively related to beliefs (Hergovich & Arendasy, 2005; Musch & 
Ehrenberg, 2002), but several other studies have failed to find such a connection, or the 
relationships have been weak (reviews: Wiseman & Watt, 2006; Vyse, 1997). 
Hypotheses on more specific cognitive abilities that might explain individual 
differences in the beliefs have also been proposed. These hypotheses can be roughly 
categorized into those on critical thinking and on understanding the principles of 
science, those on deductive reasoning, and those on understanding probability. 
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The first type of cognitive deficit suggested as an explanation for paranormal beliefs 
is that believers fail to critically evaluate paranormal claims. However, there is little 
empirical evidence to support this suggestion (review: French & Wilson, 2007). For 
example, Roe (1999) found no differences between paranormal believers and skeptics 
on their ability to evaluate the validity of research reports, and Hergovich and Arendasy 
(2005) also failed to detect a relationship between paranormal beliefs and a composite 
measure of critical thinking. 
Yates and Chandler (2000) investigated whether anti-scientific attitudes, rather than 
abilities, were related to New Age beliefs, but found no connection. However, courses 
teaching the principles of scientific and critical thinking, such as the role of empirical 
evidence for evaluating claims, do seem to lead to a decrease in paranormal beliefs 
(Morier & Keeports, 1994). Likewise, when Shtulman and Valcarcel (2012) asked study 
participants to provide explanations for their beliefs, supernatural believers referred to 
evidence less often than skeptics did. Crucially, believers cited less evidence even for 
their scientific beliefs, implying that the believers and skeptics differed generally in 
their epistemological sophistication.  
The second type of cognitive ability factor that has been suggested to explain 
paranormal beliefs is the ability for deductive reasoning. This is one of the few 
cognitive ability factors that do differentiate paranormal believers robustly from 
skeptics (reviews: French & Wilson, 2007; Wiseman & Watt, 2006). For example, 
Wierzbicki (1985) found paranormal beliefs to be related to errors on conditional 
reasoning tasks. Subsequent studies have replicated this relationship and have 
determined that it is not limited to tasks on particular topics but emerges also on tasks 
that are highly abstract and content-free (Roberts & Seager, 1999) and on tasks with 
both anti-paranormal and pro-paranormal conclusions (Lawrence & Peters, 2004). Thus, 
the evidence suggests that paranormal belief is indeed related to poorer deductive 
reasoning, irrespective of the topic.  
Finally, numerous studies have focused on the relation between paranormal beliefs 
and difficulties in understanding the concept of probability. The idea here is that if a 
person underestimates the power of chance, then ordinary coincidences will simply feel 
too strange to be brushed off as chance and will instead evoke feelings of paranormal 
meaning and purpose. For example, Blackmore and Trościanko (1985) reported that 
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paranormal believers underestimated the odds of winning by guessing at a coin tossing 
game. However, the results of later studies have been inconsistent (a recent review: 
Rogers, Davis, & Fisk, 2009), with the data of many studies supporting the hypothesis 
of probability misjudgment (Dagnall, Parker, & Munley, 2007; Roberts & Seager, 1999; 
Rogers et al., 2009; Rogers, Fisk, & Wiltshire, 2011) and others questioning the 
importance of probabilistic thinking skills for interpreting real-life events (Bressan, 
2002). In short, the evidence is inconclusive on the role that probability misjudgment 
plays for paranormal beliefs. 
 
1.1.2 Overactive pattern perception  
Another approach to explaining PSMS beliefs has examined the tendency of believers 
to perceive patterns and causality. According to this approach, paranormal beliefs are 
caused by adopting looser criteria for judging coincidences as being meaningful. For 
instance, on a computer task where participants had to attempt to ascertain the rule that 
determined when they were rewarded, paranormal believers tested fewer hypotheses 
than the skeptics, but nevertheless accepted suggested rules as valid (Brugger & Graves, 
1997). The authors concluded that this finding illustrates the believers’ looser criteria to 
believe in causal connections that do not actually exist. Paranormal believers have also 
been found to produce more unusual associations for unrelated words (Gianotti, Mohr, 
Pizzagalli, Lehmann, & Brugger, 2001) and to favor false alarms over misses when 
searching for meaningful stimuli among noise (Krummenacher, Mohr, Haker, & 
Brugger, 2009; Riekki, Lindeman, Aleneff, Halme, & Nuortimo, in press). Overall, this 
approach seems to be well supported by evidence (reviews: French & Wilson, 2007; 
Wiseman & Watt, 2006).  
However, at this point it is unclear whether the tendency to find meaning in noise is 
related specifically to paranormal beliefs. Brugger and colleagues (e.g., Brugger & 
Graves, 1997) suggest that loose response criteria are the cause for much delusional 
thought and suggest that the continuum from strict to loose response criteria might 
overlap with the continuum of schizotypal traits. Thus, finding meaning in noise might 
produce many other kinds of beliefs besides PSMS beliefs. 
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1.1.3 The laws of sympathetic magic 
One influential theory of magical thinking (Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986; Rozin 
& Nemeroff, 2002) asserts that present-day Westerners’ beliefs and behavior display 
some of the same principles of magical thinking that the anthropologists in the late 19th 
and early 20th century ascribed to traditional cultures: the two laws of sympathetic 
magic (Frazer, 1922/1963; Tylor, 1871/1974). The first, the law of contagion, holds that 
things that have once been in contact continue to exert influence on each other. This 
influence is thought to continue if the “essence” of one thing (especially a person or an 
animal) has been transferred to another thing. For example, a piece of clothing worn by 
an evil person has become contaminated by evil. In experiments, people have been 
reluctant to drink water that had been in contact with a cockroach even when it had been 
sterilized (Rozin et al., 1986), and have behaved as if they could wash away their 
previous bad luck by washing their hands (Xu, Zwick, & Schwarz, 2012). 
The second law, the law of similarity, entails that a representation of an object 
contains the “essence” of that object, and the actions taken on that representation thus 
affect the object itself. For example, people are less accurate at throwing darts at a 
picture of someone they like (Rozin et al., 1986) and they experience anxiety when 
destroying photographs of personally valued objects (Hood, Donnelly, Leonards, & 
Bloom, 2010). In short, it has been firmly established that people’s beliefs and behavior 
adhere to these laws. Hood (2010) even considers these laws to be one of the most 
central building blocks of a universal tendency for supernatural thinking. 
However, even the proponents of this view agree that the laws of sympathetic magic 
are not sufficient to explain magical thinking in its entirety. Rather, the proponents 
consider that these principles provide an explanation for a subset of magical thinking 
that does not directly involve a sense of human-like agency, but rather involves the 
transmission of essence or force (Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000; Rozin & Nemeroff, 2002).  
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1.2 Challenges for the study of PSMS beliefs 
Above I have presented some of the most prominent cognitive explanations offered for 
PSMS beliefs. All of these approaches have made important progress in uncovering 
some of the cognitive factors associated with one or several types of paranormal, 
superstitious, magical, or supernatural beliefs. Despite decades of research, however, 
these approaches have yet to provide a clear answer to the question of why so many 
people hold these beliefs and why others do not. With some of the approaches, such as 
the probability misjudgment hypothesis, successive studies have yielded contradictory 
findings. Other findings, such as overactive pattern perception, in turn, have proven to 
be more robust, but it is unclear whether these findings apply to only a subset of PSMS 
beliefs, to all relevant beliefs, or more broadly to ill-founded beliefs and delusions that 
might not be of a supernatural nature at all. The present thesis argues that there are two 
main reasons that these approaches have not produced clearer explanations for PSMS 
beliefs: Conceptual vagueness and a basic problem with investigating domain-general 
cognitive functions.  
 
1.2.1 Conceptual vagueness and the lack of a definition 
First, the most basic problem in research on paranormal, superstitious, magical, and 
supernatural beliefs has been that it has been unclear which beliefs are part of the same 
psychological phenomenon and which are not. Consequently, it is difficult to determine 
whether findings obtained with one specific set of paranormal beliefs (e.g., ESP, a 
review: Wiseman & Watt, 2006) apply to other types of paranormal beliefs (e.g. a belief 
in astrology). In the research literature, the terms paranormal, superstitious, magical, 
and supernatural have been used inconsistently. In particular, the exactly same beliefs 
have been filed under different constructs; belief in witches, for example, has been 
labeled as paranormal, supernatural, magical, and superstitious. Conversely, the same 
constructs have been used to refer to very different beliefs, as in the case of superstition, 
which has been exemplified by the fear of nonpoisonous snakes and the belief in an 
afterlife, among others (all references in Paper I). As the field has not had clear 
definitions of these terms, it has been unclear what these beliefs are, whether they differ 
from each other, and how they differ from other beliefs. 
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The main problem, however, has been that conceptual agreement has been weak in 
the whole field. There appears to be no consensus whatsoever on the way the concepts 
of paranormal, superstitious, magical, and supernatural should be defined. Consensus 
has been lacking for basic questions such as why belief in immortal souls should be 
considered to be supernatural while the belief that vitamin C prevents flu should not. 
Another disputable case is the belief in extraterrestrials, with some authors including it 
in studies of paranormal beliefs along with beliefs in phenomena such as ghosts (King, 
Burton, Hicks, & Drigotas, 2007), while others argue we should be careful in labeling 
beliefs in extraterrestrials as supernatural (Swami, Furnham, Haubner, Stieger, & 
Voracek, 2009). 
Further, researchers disagree on the interrelationships of the beliefs. Some authors 
have used two, three, or all four concepts synonymously without differentiating them. 
Other researchers, in turn, have treated these concepts as being hierarchically related. 
One can find examples of research papers suggesting each of the four concepts to be 
superordinate to the others. 
To gain clarity on these concepts, Paper I was conducted as a literature review of 
conceptual and operational definitions of paranormal, superstitious, magical, and 
supernatural beliefs. The main objective of Paper I was to address the following 
question: Is there reason to conceptually separate the concepts of paranormal, 
superstitious, magical, and supernatural beliefs, or can they instead all be covered and 
distinguished from other unfounded beliefs by one definition? 
 
1.2.2 Empirical meagerness 
The second challenge for the study of PSMS beliefs is that few clear empirical findings 
have emerged from studies adopting the traditional cognitive approaches presented 
above. Many of the relationships discovered have been demonstrated to be unreplicable 
when studied in different settings and populations, and the results have been generally 
inconsistent and the proportions of explained variance generally small (reviews: Irwin, 
2009; Vyse, 1997). This thesis argues that as long as explanations are sought in domain-
general cognitive factors, groundbreaking findings are unlikely. By definition, domain-
general cognitive processes concern general forms of information processing that work 
in the same way irrespective of the topic at hand. For example, the studies on overactive 
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pattern perception have purposely used experimental tasks that are devoid of 
paranormal content and have argued that the tendency to see causal connections where 
there are none is a domain-general tendency (Brugger & Graves, 1997; Gianotti et al., 
2001).  
The problem with domain-general approaches, such as cognitive deficits, overactive 
pattern perception, and the laws of contagion and similarity, is that while these factors 
may increase paranormal beliefs, they may also increase poorly supported beliefs in 
general, paranoia, and disgust towards microbially contaminated items, which are not 
paranormal beliefs at all. Thus, knowing that these cognitive factors are associated with 
PSMS beliefs still leaves open the question of why these factors increase paranormal 
beliefs in some people, but take the form of non-paranormal beliefs in others. Moreover, 
as PSMS beliefs concern phenomena that by definition are against (gr. para), outside 
(lat. para) or above (lat. super) that which is natural and normal, it seems reasonable to 
focus on the specific content of these beliefs. In this vein, researchers on PSMS beliefs 
have increasingly turned to domain-specific theories. Two types of theories can be 
distinguished and will be presented next: the theories concerning counterintuitive 
representations, and theories concerning intuitive biases.  
 
1.3 Counterintuitive representations  
Since the 1990s, a new paradigm within the study of religion has increasingly attempted 
to explain religious beliefs and practices with reference to cognitive factors. This 
paradigm, the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR), aims to explain how religious 
concepts are mentally represented, why they tend to be of certain types and not others, 
and why religions are so widespread (Atran & Norenzayan, 2005a; Barrett, 2000; 
Boyer, 2003). 
The central insight of the CSR is that religious beliefs engage early-developing, 
domain-specific understanding of conceptual categories such as “person,” “object,” and 
“artifact” (Barrett, 2000; Boyer, 2003). Scholars have noted that religious conceptions, 
especially a belief in God or gods, tend to deviate from our everyday expectations on 
these conceptual categories on only a limited number of aspects. It has been argued that 
this “minimal counterintuitiveness” (Atran & Norenzayan, 2005a) is the reason that 
certain conceptions become successful cultural representations and easy to adopt. 
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Another observation is that religious concepts typically center on agency. As gods, 
angels, devils, prayer, spirits all involve intentional agents that break one’s expectations 
of intentional agents, it has been suggested that the source of religious thinking is 
overattribution of agency (Barrett, 2000; Dein & Littlewood, 2011).  
As is evident from the above, the ideas introduced in the CSR are specific to 
religious beliefs and the literature has not focused on PSMS beliefs in general. Even 
though many religious beliefs share obvious representational similarities with PSMS 
beliefs, it is unclear whether the results on religious beliefs are generalizable to common 
non-religious PSMS beliefs, such as beliefs in astrology, telepathy, and lucky numbers. 
Overall, beliefs per se and individual-level cognitive factors are not the focus of interest 
of the CSR, as it emphasizes cultural questions and group-level processes. These 
include the role of public religious rituals for reinforcing beliefs and for maintaining a 
moral reputation and social coherence (Atran & Norenzayan, 2005a; Barrett, 2000; 
Boyer, 2003; Gervais, Willard, Norenzayan, & Henrich, 2011).  
It is also difficult to evaluate the relationship of the CSR literature to the work on the 
psychology of PSMS belief because the fields use the same terms in different ways. 
Most importantly, in the CSR, intuition refers to common sense (Atran & Norenzayan, 
2005b), whereas in psychology it has a more specific meaning, which will be discussed 
in the following sections. Despite these difficulties in integrating findings obtained 
within the CSR with work on PSMS beliefs in general, the CSR has been important for 
focusing attention on the domain-specific representational content of supernatural 
beliefs. In contrast to the domain-general theories discussed earlier, by focusing on the 
contents of the representations, the counterintuitiveness position aims to address the 
central question of why people specifically adopt supernatural beliefs and not some 
other types of beliefs.  
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1.4 The present perspective: intuitive biases 
The other domain-specific approach to supernatural beliefs builds directly on advances 
in developmental psychology and dual-process theories of thinking. This approach 
traces the roots of supernatural thought to domain-specific cognitive biases that are 
suggested to be universally present in normally developing children. Children, evidence 
suggests, tend to hold a dualistic view of the mind and body, in which mental processes 
continue after death (Bering & Bjorklund, 2004; Bloom, 2007; Harris & Gimenéz, 
2005). Children also tend to see the world teleologically as if everything was designed 
for a purpose (E. M.  Evans, 2000; E. M. Evans, 2008; Kelemen, 1999; Kelemen, 
Callanan, Casler, & Pérez-Granados, 2005; Legare, Evans, Rosengren, & Harris, 2012), 
and their notions of biological processes seem to involve the notion of a vital energy 
(Inagaki & Hatano, 2004; Morris, Taplin, & Gelman, 2000). It may be noted that similar 
notions were described earlier by Piaget (1929/1951), whose observations of children’s 
thinking included, for example, that children intuitively confuse symbolic 
representations and material objects, overattribute animacy and consciousness to 
inanimate things, and see objects in the natural world as made for humans. 
Thus, while the counterintuitiveness approach considers supernatural beliefs to be a 
violation of early-developing basic conceptions of ontological categories in the world, 
the intuitive biases view sees the beliefs as a reflection of these conceptions. Recently, 
even some scholars within the CSR have concurred that supernatural beliefs are a 
reflection of inborn biases (Barrett, 2012). 
 
1.4.1 Background: dual-process theory 
The intuitive biases view is closely tied to dual-process theories of thinking. In dual-
process theories, a distinction is made between two types of cognitive processes: 
intuitive and analytical. Several variations of dual-process theories have been proposed, 
as well as several different terms (reviewed in J. St. B. T. Evans, 2008). For example, 
Epstein’s cognitive-experiential self-theory distinguishes between information 
processing that is intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 
1994), while Sloman (1996) distinguished between processing that is associative and 
rule-based. Simply put, intuitions are thoughts and preferences that come to mind 
effortlessly and without conscious reflection, and that feel to be self-evidently true. In 
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contrast, analytical thinking is deliberate, systematic, and requires concentration 
(Epstein, 2010; Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox, & Sadler-Smith, 2008; Kahneman, 2003). 
Recently, it has been suggested that the central difference between the two types of 
processing is that intuitive processing (generically termed Type 1 by Stanovich, 1999) is 
autonomous and not dependent on working memory, while analytical thinking (Type 2) 
has the opposite characteristics (J. St. B. T. Evans, 2012; Stanovich & Toplak, 2012).  
Two main theoretical orientations have been proposed to account for how intuitive 
and analytical processes interact. The first is referred to as the parallel-competitive 
theories, where both types of processes operate simultaneously and compete for control 
over thoughts and actions. This suggestion is considered by many authors to be 
implausible and unparsimonious due to the double resources that would be required by 
the two parallel processes (e.g., De Neys, 2012; J. St. B. T. Evans, 2010).  
The other view, which is referred to as default-interventionist, has gained more 
support (J. St. B. T. Evans, 2008). According to this orientation, intuition is primary and 
accounts for most of human thinking, while analytical processes monitor the outputs of 
intuitive processing, and may intervene. Lately, even this view has been criticized as 
being too simple, and additional types of processes have been proposed. For example, 
several authors have called for a separate processing step that monitors intuitions 
without engaging a complete, conscious Type 2 analysis (Bonner & Newell, 2010; De 
Neys, 2012; J. St. B. T. Evans, 2009).  
A specific type of default-interventionist theory has been proposed by Stanovich 
(1999, 2009a, 2009b), who argues that we should distinguish between not two but three 
levels of processes. In this view, Type 2 processes can be further divided into two types: 
the ability to constrain intuition and engage in analytic processing (the algorithmic 
mind) and the tendency to actually do so (the reflective mind). This corresponds to the 
distinction between an algorithmic and a rational processing level (J. R. Anderson, 
1990). In any case, dual-process theorists agree that because of the different ways of 
processing information, two different conceptions of the same issue may be formed by 
the same individual and may then co-exist in the same mind.  
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1.4.2 Paranormal beliefs and core knowledge confusions  
As dual-process theories suggest, people may hold two different conceptions of the 
same phenomenon. For example, transmission of illness and disease may be conceived 
of in both magical and biological terms (Legare & Gelman, 2008). It is also possible 
that the intuitive biases that children harbor and that are linked to PSMS beliefs can be 
found even among adults who hold these beliefs, alongside scientific knowledge that 
they learned later. In line with this, Lindeman and Aarnio (2007) formulated their 
theory of PSMS beliefs. Following their definition of PSMS beliefs as category 
mistakes in which the core attributes of mental, physical, and biological entities and 
processes are confused with each other, they predicted and found that agreement with 
core knowledge confusions, such as the statement “An evil thought is contaminated”, 
did indeed discriminate between a group of strong paranormal believers and a group of 
strong skeptics better than any other cognitive or emotional factor that was studied.  
Further support for the idea that core knowledge confusions play a role for 
paranormal beliefs comes from studies using electroencephalography (EEG). EEG 
measurements reveal that the N400 effect elicited by statements that contain core 
knowledge confusions is larger in paranormal believers than in skeptics (Lindeman et 
al., 2008). As the N400 is known to arise from processing semantically unexpected 
material (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011), this result can be interpreted as indicating that in 
comparison to skeptics, the paranormal believers have more difficulty determining the 
literal truth of core knowledge sentences.  
In the present thesis, the hypothesis that an acceptance of core knowledge confusion 
statements as being literally true is related to PSMS beliefs was further tested in Papers 
II, III and IV using several, larger datasets that were not restrained to extreme believers 
and skeptics. Paper IV tested the general hypothesis that core knowledge confusions are 
related to PSMS beliefs. 
If the definition of PSMS beliefs as core knowledge confusions holds true, it should 
cover all forms of PSMS beliefs, including those that have not previously been included 
in popular assessment measures. One such belief is that random but important life 
events occur for a purpose. This belief is very common, strong and found cross-
culturally (Deridder, Hendriks, Zani, Pepitone, & Saffiotti, 1999; Lupfer, Tolliver, & 
Jackson, 1996) but it has not been included in the measures that have been used to 
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assess PSMS beliefs (for recent reviews of assessment methods, see Irwin, 2009 and the 
online supplementary table to Paper I, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0027158.supp). Most 
authors, however, seem to agree that seeing purpose in random events is a form of 
supernatural belief (e.g., E. M. Evans & Wellman, 2006; Gjersoe & Hood, 2006; Zusne 
& Jones, 1989). Bering (2002, 2006), in turn, has argued that attributing purpose to 
random events is an evolved bias that is present in all humans in one form or another. 
Similarly, Guthrie (1993) has suggested that the tendency to see justice in events is a 
manifestation of an evolved predisposition to overattribute agency to the workings of 
the world. The focus of Paper II was to investigate the relationship of beliefs in the 
purpose of events to beliefs traditionally included in the PSMS beliefs literature, and to 
determine whether they are universal or can be explained by individual differences in 
the same core knowledge confusions as other PSMS beliefs.  
 
1.4.3 Core knowledge confusions involving energy and force 
Leslie (1994) has suggested that the core knowledge of the physical domain includes a 
basic notion of force or energy, which in physical interactions is transferred from one 
object to another. While energy and force are two different concepts in science, lay 
people often consider them to be one and the same (Chabalengula, Sanders, & Mumba, 
2012). Several authors have also made the observation that beliefs about magical 
causation often refer to spiritual energies and forces (Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000; Zusne & 
Jones, 1989). However, as Lindeman and Saher (2007) observe, the esoteric use of the 
word “energy” is very different from how the concept is used in science. The idea of 
spiritual energy is more reminiscent of the concept of vitalistic energy that young 
children hold (Inagaki & Hatano, 2004; Morris et al., 2000). In support of this 
contention, Lindeman and Saher (2007) concluded that alongside scientifically correct 
conceptions, strong paranormal believers exhibited vitalistic energy conceptions. For 
instance, when asked to explain biological processes, such as why a wound heals, the 
paranormal believers referred to energy. They also accepted statements that described 
energy as having attributes of living organisms and mental phenomena, such as healing, 
being living or being spiritual. Thus, conceptions in which energy and force are 
described with the attributes from other ontological categories can be considered to be 
core knowledge confusions. 
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Scholars interested in esoteric or vitalistic conceptions of energy are not, however, 
the only researchers to have studied people’s notions of energy. As energy is a central 
concept in physics, people’s understanding of it is the natural focus of extensive 
research on science learning (e.g., Saglam-Arslan, 2010). Of interest to the present 
thesis, the literature on physics education research reveals that students tend to think of 
energy as some type of generic fuel, which is especially used by humans (Driver, 
Squires, Rushworth, & Wood-Robinson, 1994; Nordine, Krajcik, & Fortus, 2011; 
Trumper, 1993). Studies in physics education research have not, however, tended to 
directly investigate whether people conceive of energy as having properties from the 
ontological categories of living and animate phenomena.  
With the aim of integrating these two lines of research, Paper III investigated 
whether students in upper secondary school (ages 15-18) would hold conceptions of 
energy as living and animate. The idea was that this group of participants would be 
relatively non-selected with respect to PSMS beliefs. Conducting the study among 
students also enabled us to analyze the relationship of these conceptions to the students’ 
scientifically valid energy conceptions. In line with dual-process theory and the 
previous studies that indicate that early, ontologically incorrect conceptions continue to 
influence people’s responses long after they have consciously been replaced with 
scientific views (McCloskey, Caramazza, & Green, 1980; Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012), 
ontologically confused conceptions were expected to co-exist in the students’ minds 
with conceptions that were more in line with scientifically accepted views.  
References to esoteric energies are also intrinsic to many forms of complementary 
and alternative medicine (CAM). For example, crystal healing is based on the idea of 
creating a healing energy field around the patient and unblocking the patient’s energy. 
Therefore, Paper III also investigated whether conceptions of energy as being 
psychological and biological are related to a trust in CAM.  
 
1.4.4 Conceptual change 
To understand the nature of people’s ontologically confused intuitive conceptions, an 
important question concerns their stability. In light of the co-existence findings 
discussed above, ontological misconceptions seem resistant to change. On the other 
hand, researchers in science education have argued that lay notions are not as clear, 
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robust and discrete as scientific conceptions are, but are rather fragmented, flexible and 
open to change and development – after all, this is the basis for learning (Amin, 2009; 
diSessa, Gillespie, & Esterly, 2004; Gupta, Hammer, & Redish, 2010; Hammer & Elby, 
2003). 
Thus, the second aim of Paper III was to investigate whether the students’ 
conceptions would change during the physics courses from which the study participants 
were recruited. Inspired by studies on teaching science topics that are ontologically 
challenging (Slotta & Chi, 2006; Wiser & Amin, 2001), a lesson that directly targeted 
ontological differences between common conceptions and scientific views (hereafter 
referred to as the Targeted Lesson) was especially designed for this study. Attending 
this lesson was expected to lead to larger decreases in ontologically confused 
conceptions than attending the regular curriculum without this additional intervention. 
 
1.4.5 Intuitive thinking 
As PSMS beliefs seem resistant to critical argumentation, many researchers have been 
interested in determining whether these beliefs are linked to a preference for intuitive 
information processing. As support for this idea, researchers have gathered that in both 
intuitive thinking and paranormal belief, personal experiences are taken as valid even 
when they contradict scientific knowledge (Epstein, 2010; King et al., 2007; Sadler-
Smith, 2011). Some of the most direct evidence on the role of intuitive thinking in 
producing supernatural belief comes from a study that experimentally manipulated 
thinking to be more intuitive. A writing task requesting participants to reminisce about a 
time when trusting their intuition led to good outcomes temporarily increased their 
assessments of their belief in God (Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012). In the present 
thesis, intuitive thinking was approached both by using self-report measures of the 
participants’ characteristic thinking style, and by using an experimental manipulation 
(speeded responding) that favors intuitive conceptions. 
Several studies have linked the self-reported tendency to rely on intuition to a variety 
of PSMS beliefs (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Genovese, 2005; King et 
al., 2007; King & Hicks, 2009; Sadler-Smith, 2011; Wolfradt, Oubaid, Straube, 
Bischoff, & Mischo, 1999). In one of the largest surveys on this topic to date, with more 
than 3 000 respondents, Lindeman and Aarnio (2006) found that faith in intuition 
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predicted PSMS beliefs better than a range of emotional factors, such as emotional 
instability and the desire for control. Further, the intuitive style turned out to mediate 
the regularly found differences in belief by gender and educational level. In other 
words, women held more PSMS beliefs than men partly because they were more 
intuitive than men, and people with lower educational attainments held more beliefs 
partly because they were more intuitive than people at higher educational levels 
(Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006).  
In line with the above findings, the present thesis investigated the relationship of an 
intuitive thinking style both to core knowledge confusions and paranormal beliefs 
(Paper IV), and to ontologically confused energy conceptions (Paper III). An intuitive 
style was expected to positively predict all of these variables. 
The second way in which intuitive thinking was approached in this thesis was by 
investigating whether the acceptance of core knowledge confusions increases when 
response time is limited. This hypothesis was based on the assumption that core 
knowledge confusions are based on intuitive processing, which is usually inhibited and 
censored by analytical processes. The expectation was that the short time allotted for 
responding would simply not allow analytical processing and thus, the responses would 
reveal more intuitive conceptions. This hypothesis is in line with previous findings 
showing that speeded conditions increase teleological attributions (Kelemen & Rosset, 
2009) and reduce analytic reasoning processes (J. St. B. T. Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 
2005). Similarly, limiting executive resources by burdening them with a secondary task 
has been shown to increase heuristic responses at the expense of logical responses (De 
Neys, 2006). In the present thesis, core knowledge confusions were chosen as the 
dependent variable because we assumed they form the basis of PSMS beliefs. Thus, 
Study 1 of Paper IV tested the hypothesis that an acceptance of core knowledge 
confusions increases under conditions that favor intuitive processing, that is, under time 
pressure. 
 
1.4.6 Analytical and reflective thinking  
In addition to intuitive thinking, researchers have been interested in the role of 
analytical thinking in explaining individual differences in PSMS beliefs. The 
assumption has generally been that the predilection to analyze questions carefully and 
29 
 
consciously should lead to a lower endorsement of paranormal claims. Research 
findings have, however, been less consistent on this point than for intuitive thinking. 
The self-reported tendency to rely on analytical thinking has sporadically shown slight 
negative associations (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006) or positive associations (Wolfradt et 
al., 1999) with various PSMS beliefs, but in most studies, no associations were 
established (Epstein et al., 1996; Genovese, 2005; King et al., 2007; Sadler-Smith, 
2011; Yates & Chandler, 2000). However, to support the role of analytical thinking for 
supernatural beliefs, experimental manipulations that increase participants’ analytical 
thinking (for example, by showing them a photo of Rodin’s statue The Thinker), have 
been found to lead people to assess their religiosity as lower (Gervais & Norenzayan, 
2012). Why, then, has this relationship not been found in studies of thinking style? 
One possible reason for this lack of findings is methodological.  Most of the above 
studies operationalized the analytical thinking style as a need for cognition (NFC), 
which refers to engagement in and enjoyment of thinking (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & 
Jarvis, 1996; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). As it is possible that the NFC conflates 
actual Type 2 thinking with mere ruminations on intuitions, the present thesis turned to 
other possible means of measuring preferences for analytical or rational thinking.  
One such measure is the Actively Open-Minded Thinking (AOT) self-assessment 
scale (Sá, West, & Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 1997). This scale has been 
designed to assess intellectual aims and epistemic values, such as the willingness to 
perspective-switch, decontextualize, and to consider alternative opinions and evidence. 
Evidence suggests this scale succeeds in its aims, as it has been negatively linked to the 
ability to justify one’s views using evidence (Sá, Kelley, Ho, & Stanovich, 2005) and 
positively to the ability to overcome belief bias on reasoning tasks (Macpherson & 
Stanovich, 2007). Actively open-minded thinking has also been found to be related to 
lower superstition in a mature student sample (Sá et al., 2005) and among 10-11-year-
olds (Kokis, Macpherson, Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2002).  
Another measure intended to measure Type 2 thinking is the Argument Evaluation 
Test (AET; Stanovich & West, 1997). This test was designed to measure one’s ability to 
evaluate objective argument quality independently of one’s own beliefs, and it has been 
found negatively related to superstitious thinking (Stanovich & West, 1997) and 
positively to performance on reasoning tasks, even when controlling for intelligence 
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(Stanovich & West, 1998). Thus, several findings converge in favor of the argument 
that these measures capture the essential features of Type 2 thought better than the NFC.  
Based on the above considerations, the present thesis included both the NFC, and 
AOT and AET among the potential predictors of core knowledge confusions and 
paranormal beliefs (Paper IV) and students’ ontologically confused energy conceptions 
(Paper III). AOT and AET were expected to be better predictors of beliefs than NFC. 
Further, it should be noted that neither AOT and AET nor NFC were expected to be the 
opposite of the intuitive style, but to complement it and possibly explain an additional 
independent portion of the variation in the beliefs.  
 
1.4.7 Cognitive inhibition 
The last factor whose relationship to PSMS beliefs the present thesis studied was 
cognitive inhibition. Cognitive inhibition generally refers to those executive functions, 
a.k.a. forms of cognitive control, that involve suppressing, restraining, stopping or 
overriding a mental process. Inhibition is central for everyday functioning, as normal 
cognition involves a constant need to choose between competing sensory inputs and to 
adjust behavior to changing circumstances (M. C. Anderson & Levy, 2007). For 
example, cognitive inhibition involves suppressing unwanted or irrelevant thoughts, 
withholding inappropriate responses, and controlling one’s attention in relation to one’s 
goals. Within these processes, researchers often distinguish between those that 
correspond to different processing levels: perceptual, working memory, and response 
output (Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Nigg, 2000; Redick, Heitz, & Engle, 2007). 
Cognitive inhibition is considered to be resource-dependent and to display considerable 
individual variation (Gorfein & MacLeod, 2007).  
The relationship between cognitive inhibition and the other factors that are studied in 
this thesis is not entirely clear. The default-interventionist dual-process theories use the 
term inhibition and posit that intuitive responses are inhibited by analytic processes (J. 
St. B. T. Evans, 2008, 2010). However, studies on dual-process theory seldom cite 
research on inhibition and currently these research areas are not fully integrated. In 
addition, studies on cognitive inhibition typically employ experimental tasks on which it 
is relatively easy to designate stimuli as targets to be processed and distractors to avoid. 
Therefore, these tasks involve basic cognitive processes such as arithmetic, visual 
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selective attention, and recall of list items, but seldom reasoning or beliefs (e.g., M. C. 
Anderson & Levy, 2007).  
One of the few dual-process theorists who have attempted to integrate the concept of 
cognitive inhibition with dual-process theory is Stanovich (2009a, 2009b). To 
Stanovich, a crucial prerequisite for carrying out analytic processes is an inhibiting of 
default intuitive responses, but this does not alone translate to rational thought or 
behavior. This framework gives clearly separable roles for cognitive inhibition and for 
reflective processes in the reasoning system. Consequently, it also presents criteria to 
determine which component of the reasoning system each assessment method measures. 
Stanovich argues that for a task to measure reflective tendencies, it must leave open the 
choice of a solution, as in the AOT and AET discussed in Section 1.4.6. In contrast, 
traditional means of measuring inhibition provide participants with clearly defined 
instructions. Thus, Stanovich argues that these methods reveal nothing about whether 
the person will choose to reason rationally, but that they can instead be used to measure 
the algorithmic capacity that is needed to inhibit the default intuitive processes. 
In the present thesis, it was expected that effective cognitive inhibition would be 
related to skepticism, or in other words, that weak cognitive inhibition would be related 
to PSMS beliefs and to core knowledge confusions. Previous findings also support this 
hypothesis. First, group comparisons of strong supernatural believers and skeptics have 
demonstrated that the believers perform more poorly on the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test, including the subscale of perseverative errors, which is considered to measure 
inhibition problems (Lindeman, Riekki, & Hood, 2011). Second, the intuitive 
teleological and animistic biases that are considered by many to be one of the roots of 
PSMS beliefs have been shown to be more common among people with Alzheimer’s 
disease, in which inhibitory control deteriorates (Lombrozo, Kelemen, & Zaitchik, 
2007; Zaitchik & Solomon, 2008). Third, decreased cognitive inhibition and PSMS 
beliefs share many correlates that are not directly related to these beliefs, such as 
creativity, feelings of threat, and intuitive thinking (references in Paper V). 
The concept of cognitive inhibition was approached in this thesis in two ways. First, 
Study 1 of Paper IV investigated the relationship of PSMS beliefs and core knowledge 
confusions to individual performance differences on a Stroop test. Various versions of 
Stroop tests are popular in research as well as in the clinical neuropsychological 
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assessment of executive functions. In the color-word Stroop test, participants are 
presented with the names of colors printed in different color fonts, and requested to 
name the font color while disregarding the verbal content. On congruent trials, the word 
and the font color match, while on incongruent trials they are incompatible (for 
example, the word “green” is printed in blue). People tend to take longer to respond and 
to make more errors on the incongruent than on the congruent stimuli. This decrease in 
color-naming speed is called the Stroop interference effect (MacLeod, 1991, 2005; 
Strauss, Sherman, & Spreen, 2006).  
The specific functions underlying the Stroop interference effect are suggested to 
primarily reflect the perceptual and response stages of processing (Friedman & Miyake, 
2004; Nigg, 2000; Redick, Heitz, & Engle, 2007). Furthermore, it has been suggested 
that the resolution between competing processes in working memory (processing of the 
word’s font color versus its verbal content) also contribute to the Stroop effect (Kane & 
Engle, 2003). Thus, the Stroop test was selected in the present thesis to act as a general 
measure of cognitive inhibition. In line with previous findings linking teleological and 
animistic biases to weaker inhibition as measured by a Stroop test (Kelemen & Rosset, 
2009), we expected the magnitude of the Stroop interference effect to be related to 
accepting more core knowledge confusions.  
The second way in which cognitive inhibition was approached in the present thesis 
was through functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Paper V used fMRI to 
investigate whether people who hold PSMS beliefs differ from skeptics in terms of their 
brain activations when viewing stimuli that invite supernatural interpretations. The 
focus of interest was an area in the right inferior frontal gyrus (right IFG), as both 
imaging and lesion studies have linked activation in this area to tasks that require 
cognitive inhibition (a review: Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004). Damage to the right 
IFG impairs performance on tasks that require quick switching between two tasks, or 
tasks that require response inhibition, such as go/no-go tasks, in which one should 
routinely press a button but be able to refrain from pushing the button when a no-go 
signal is presented. Imaging studies indicate that in healthy subjects, this same area is 
active during those tasks.  
Furthermore, right IFG activation has recently even been implicated in the context of 
higher cognition. On syllogistic reasoning tasks, right IFG activation is related to 
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performance on trials on which beliefs and logic are in conflict and on which 
responding correctly is considered to require the inhibition of beliefs (De Neys, 
Vartanian, & Goel, 2008; Goel & Dolan, 2003; Tsujii, Masuda, Akiyama, & Watanabe, 
2010; Tsujii & Watanabe, 2010). Furthermore, disrupting right IFG function through 
repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) enhances belief bias on these tasks, 
which can be taken to indicate impaired inhibition of belief-based responses (Tsujii, 
Sakatani, Masuda, Akiyama, & Watanabe, 2011). Based on these results, we expected 
that the hypothesized weaker cognitive inhibition of the paranormal believers would 
show as weaker right IFG activation as compared to skeptics, when viewing material 
that invites supernatural thoughts.  
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2. Aims of the study  
 
This thesis addressed six overarching research questions (a–f below). Table 1 indicates 
which of these were addressed by each paper, and the types of data that were used. 
More detailed hypotheses are found in the original papers. 
Overarching research questions and expectations: 
a) Is there reason to conceptually separate the concepts of paranormal, superstitious, 
magical, and supernatural beliefs, or can they instead all be covered and distinguished 
from other unfounded beliefs by one definition? (Paper I) 
b) Are confusions of the core properties of mental phenomena, material objects, 
living, and animate organisms, and the processes these engage in, related to PSMS 
beliefs?  Following the definition of PSMS beliefs as involving these confusions, we 
expected people’s acceptance of statements including these confusions to be positively 
associated with their PSMS beliefs (Papers II, IV), including beliefs in the purpose of 
events (Paper II). 
c) Do conceptions of energy as being psychological and biological, a type of core 
knowledge confusion, exist along scientific conceptions among students, do they 
decrease with instruction, and are they related to trust in complementary and alternative 
medicine? The answer to these questions was expected to be yes. (Paper III) 
d) Are intuitive and reflective thinking styles related to PSMS beliefs and to core 
knowledge confusions? We expected to replicate the previously established positive 
relationship between intuitive thinking and PSMS beliefs, and to extend it to core 
knowledge confusions. In addition, we expected a reflective thinking style to be 
negatively related to the beliefs and to the confusions, providing it is assessed using 
appropriate measures designed to capture Type 2 thinking. (Papers III, IV) 
e) What is the effect of time pressure on the acceptance of core knowledge 
confusions? Time pressure was expected to increase the acceptance of these confusions. 
(Paper IV) 
f) Is cognitive inhibition related to core knowledge confusions and to PSMS beliefs? 
We expected to find that individual differences in cognitive inhibition as measured by a 
Stroop test predict core knowledge confusions (Paper IV) and that PSMS beliefs predict 
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weaker activation of the right IFG when people are viewing stimuli that may be 
interpreted as involving supernatural content (Paper V). 
 
 
Table 1. Overview of studies.  
 
Paper   Research   Participants          Data  type  
   questions  
 
 
I a  Literature review 
 
II b Study 1: 505 supernatural believers 
and skeptics who were students at 
universities, representing a wide 
variety of disciplines 
 
Study 2: 2 145 Finnish volunteers 
 
Study 1: Online self-report 
 
 
 
 
Study 2: Online self-report 
III c, d 102 upper secondary school 
students (ages 15-18) 
Self-report and follow-up 3 weeks 
after regular curriculum or 
instructional intervention 
 
IV b, d, e, f Study 1: 50 Finnish volunteers,  
of whom 62% had completed a 
bachelor’s or higher university 
degree 
 
Study 2: 458 Finnish volunteers, 
majority = students or working 
 
Study 1: Self-report, speeded 
condition and performance 
measures  
 
 
Study 2: Online self-report 
V f Pilot study: 119 Finnish volunteers 
 
Main study: 23 supernatural 
believers and skeptics 
Pilot study: Online self-report 
 
 
Main study: Self-report and fMRI 
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3. Methods 
3.1 Participants and procedures  
A total of 3 402 Finnish people (70% female) participated in the studies. The 
participants represented a wide range of ages (14–73) and occupations, including upper 
secondary school students, university students, people working full-time, participants 
recruited from a representative pool of Finnish adults, skeptics and paranormal 
believers, and volunteers from the general public recruited through public online 
discussion forums. Out of the participants, 3 227 filled in anonymous online self-report 
questionnaires, and 175 participated in studies with experimental designs. Details for 
each study are presented below. 
Paper II, Study 1: 505 Finnish volunteers, 368 females and 137 males, participated in 
the study. Ninety-four per cent of the present sample were full-time students at 
universities and they represented a wide variety of disciplines, including the humanities 
as well as the technical, natural, medical, social and behavioral sciences. The mean age 
of the participants was 24, ranging from 16 to 48. They were recruited among the 
participants in an earlier study on superstition on the grounds that their score on a 
measure of paranormal beliefs was either in the highest or lowest 10th percentile of their 
gender. The potential participants were contacted by electronic mail and they were 
referred to an online questionnaire. 
Paper II, Study 2: 2 145 Finnish volunteers participated in the study, 1 462 females 
and 683 males, with a mean age of 27.2 years, ranging from 14 to 73. The participants 
were recruited via electronic student mailing lists and five Internet discussion forums. 
The recruitment message stated the study concerned beliefs, worldview and cognition, 
and provided a link to the online questionnaire. 
Paper III:  The participants were 102 grade 10–12 students from three upper 
secondary schools in Helsinki, Finland, mean age 16 years (range 15–18), 48 females. 
The study was conducted in the classroom during school hours as part of the physics 
courses that the students were attending. Six groups participated, representing three 
consecutive course levels (Physics 1, 2 and 3). One group from each course level 
attended the Targeted Lesson and the other did not. 
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The study had a pretest–posttest design. At pretest, after obtaining the students’ 
consent, they completed a questionnaire booklet that included measures of conceptions 
of energy, trust in CAM, cognitive styles, and demographic variables. The students 
were told the study concerned what upper secondary school students think about energy. 
In the groups that attended the Targeted Lesson, the rest of the 75-minute session was 
used for a targeted lesson on ontological categories described below. In the other 
groups, the rest of the session was used on the normal course curriculum. At posttest, 
three to four weeks after pretest and towards the end of the courses, the students 
completed measures of conceptions of energy and trust in CAM. The number of 
students who completed the second questionnaire was 93.  
The duration of the targeted lesson was approximately 30 minutes and it was taught 
by the author of this thesis. The main objective of this lesson was to increase the 
awareness that descriptions of energy as biological and animate are incompatible with 
descriptions of energy as a physical process. The students were asked to discuss 
assigned questions concerning CAM and the basic attributes of lifeless objects, living 
things, animate beings, objects and processes and energy. The lesson ended by 
concluding that when energy is described as it is described in CAM, its ontological 
properties are mixed up. 
Paper IV, Study 1: The participants were 50 Finnish volunteers recruited from 
student mailing lists, by snowball sampling and by inviting participants of a previous 
study who had expressed an interest in further studies. The mean age was 34 (range 19–
62), and 74% were female. Nineteen (38%) were university students, 21 (42%) were 
working full time, and 5 (10%) were otherwise occupied. Thirty-one (62%) had 
completed a bachelor’s or higher university degree. 
Paper IV, Study 2: The participants were 458 volunteers who completed an online 
survey, recruited through messages on student mailing lists and popular, public Finnish 
online discussion forums for paranormal topics and general discussion. Three hundred 
and fifty-three (77.1%) were female, 91 (19.9%) male, and 14 persons (3.1%) did not 
disclose their gender. The mean age was 27 (SD = 7.9, range 18–65) and the majority 
were students (76.6%) or working at the time of the survey (17.2%). 
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Paper V, Pilot study: 119 volunteers (99 female, 20 male; mean age 27 years, range 
19–48) were recruited through student mailing lists and referred to an online 
questionnaire. 
Paper V, Main study: Twenty-three volunteers, none of whom had participated in the 
pilot study, were recruited from a participant pool constituting a representative sample 
of 15- to 56-year-old Finnish people. To recruit supernatural believers and skeptics, the 
subjects who were at the extreme ends (highest and lowest 10%) of the distribution of 
supernatural belief in a previous study (Lindeman, 2011) were contacted. Out of the 23 
participants, 12 were supernatural believers (6 female, 6 male; mean age 38 years, range 
23–53) and 11 were skeptics (6 female, 5 male; mean age 34 years, range 21–49). 
Additional inclusion criteria were lack of psychiatric or neurological disorders and 
fulfillment of the fMRI safety requirements. The study had prior approval from the 
ethics committee at the Hospital District of Helsinki and Uusimaa, and all subjects 
signed a written informed consent form. 
 
3.2 Measures 
Paranormal beliefs (Studies II, IV, V) were measured using items from Tobacyk’s 
(2004) Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (RPBS), which is a slightly revised version of 
the Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). This scale includes items such 
as, “Some people have an unexplained ability to predict the future,” “Psychokinesis, the 
movement of objects through psychic powers, does exist,” and “Black magic really 
exists,” which are rated on a 5-point scale (1 = completely disagree, 5 = completely 
agree). Papers II and V used Tobacyk’s (2004) original 26-item version. In Paper IV, 
three items concerning the possibility of extraterrestrial life, mind reading, and witches 
were omitted from the analysis as several participants reported giving them high ratings 
despite interpreting them in a non-paranormal way. In Study 2 of Paper IV, the scale 
was completed by adding 3 items on ghosts and spiritual beings and 3 items on lucky 
amulets from Lindeman and Aarnio (2006). 
In Study 2 of Paper IV, the 7 original subscales of the RPBS (Extraordinary life 
forms, PSI, Superstition, Precognition, Spiritualism, Traditional religious beliefs, 
Witchcraft) as well as a new subscale, Amulets, were calculated separately. The 
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reliability (all reliabilities are Cronbach’s α) of the scale ranged from .92 to .95, and the 
reliabilities of the subscales ranged from .82 to .95. 
Beliefs in the purpose of events (Paper II) were assessed by requesting participants to 
read short descriptions of random events, to imagine themselves in the situations 
described, and to then indicate on a 5-point scale whether they thought the event had a 
purpose. Study 1 of Paper II included 18 items from Lindeman and Aarnio (2007) that 
described co-occurrences with positive, negative or neutral outcomes for the participant. 
An example item is: “Your flight is delayed because of fog, and at the airport you meet 
the person whom you will get engaged to a year later. Did the fog have a purpose?” 
Study 2 included 15 items that described a broader range of events. In addition to co-
occurrences that had outcomes for the participant, items were also included that 
described singular events (e.g. “You unexpectedly got promoted at work. The 
promotion had a purpose”) and events that had outcomes for other people (e.g. “A 
lethal, contagious disease spread to Finland. The disease spread for a purpose”). In 
Study 1, the participants could interpret the word “purpose” as they wanted, and in 
Study 2, they were explicitly instructed to rate the events as having a purpose if they 
thought they were intentionally caused by an invisible agent or force. The reliability of 
the scale was .98 in Study 1 and .97 in Study 2. 
Core knowledge confusions of the attributes of physical, biological and 
psychological phenomena (Papers II and IV) were assessed by items from Lindeman 
and colleagues (2008), Lindeman and Aarnio (2007), Lindeman and Saher (2007), as 
well as by new items. The items were statements attributing (1) qualities of matter, such 
as volume, to mental phenomena (example items: “An unstable human mind is 
disintegrating,” “The mind falls apart when ill”), (2) the biological qualities of life and 
contagion to mental phenomena or to natural, lifeless entities (example items: “An evil 
thought is contaminated” and “Stars live in the sky”), and (3) mental properties, such as 
perceptions, emotions, beliefs, desires and intentions, to natural, lifeless entities, such as 
stones and planets, to plants and trees, to human-made artifacts, and to force (example 
items: “When summer is warm, flowers want to bloom,” “Planets know things,” “A 
home knows its inhabitants,” and “Force can sense a human being”).  
The participants were asked to rate whether they thought the statements could be 
literally true. Examples were given of literally true statements and fully metaphorical 
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statements to guide the participants in responding. Responses were given on a 5-point 
scale (Study 1 of Paper II) or a dichotomous scale (Study 2 of Paper II, and Paper IV). 
In Study 1 of Paper II, 3 subscales with 6-16 items each were calculated separately, and 
in Study 2 of Paper II, 6 subscales with 5 items each. The reliabilities of the subscales 
ranged from .63 to .94, and the reliability of an 11-item overall scale (Study 2 of Paper 
IV) was .88.  
In Study 1 of Paper IV, participants rated items in speeded and unspeeded conditions. 
In the speeded condition, 5 items were briefly presented on a computer screen one at a 
time, and participants were instructed to respond as quickly as possible. In the 
unspeeded condition, participants responded to another 5 items using a pen and paper 
and the response times were not limited.  
In all studies, the core knowledge questionnaires included filler items (literally true 
statements, metaphorical statements, and strange but possible statements) for 
comparison and to disguise the purpose of the questionnaire. 
Ontologically confused conceptions of energy (Study 1 of Paper II, and Paper III) 
were assessed by the following method. In Paper II Study 1, the items concentrated on 
ideas of energy as biological and mental, for example, as being capable of healing, 
living, purifying, dying, growing, withering, desiring, believing or being good, bad or 
poisonous (e.g. “Energy can grow”). These conceptions were assessed using 20 items 
from Lindeman and Saher (2007) rated on a 5-point scale (1 = does not apply at all, 5 = 
applies very well). The reliability of this scale was .94. In Study 2 of Paper II, 
corresponding items used the word “force” instead of “energy.” These items are 
described as part of the core knowledge confusions above. 
In Paper III, conceptions of energy were assessed using 64 items of the form “energy 
can ___,” selected so as to include attributes of a wider range of ontological categories. 
Three subscales were formed, describing energy as a mental property, e.g., “Energy can 
be sensed as an experience,” in biological terms, e.g., “Energy can breathe,” and with 
attributes of animate beings, e.g., “Energy can want things.” As the reliabilities of these 
subscales were weak (range = .56-.78), a composite Ontologically Confused 
Conceptions score was also calculated, which showed better reliability (α = .86). In 
addition, conceptions of energy as a material substance were assessed by 9 items (α = 
61), such as “Energy can be of a certain color,” and scientifically valid conceptions 
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were assessed by 11 items (α = .44), such as “Energy can manifest as electric current.” 
Participants rated each statement on a dichotomous scale by circling the statements they 
thought could be literally true.  
Trust in Complementary and Alternative Medicine (Paper III)  was assessed using a 
list of 13 complementary and alternative treatments that are commercially available in 
Finland: homeopathy, psychic healing, EFT (Emotional Freedom Techniques), 
anthroposophical medicine that is based on the teachings of Rudolf Steiner, 
aromatherapy, Feng Shui, treatment of blockages in the body’s energy channels or 
meridians such as Shiatsu, treatments employing life force and spiritual energy such as 
Reiki, treatments based on the four elements of the body (earth, water, fire and air), 
such as Ayurveda, the use of yoga, relaxation techniques and meditation in the 
treatment of illnesses, Horstmann therapy, distance healing such as the laying on of 
hands or healing from a longer distance, and spiritual healing and energywork. These 
items were rated on a 6-point scale (Do you believe that the following treatments are 
effective in treating illnesses? 0 = I have never heard of this treatment or I can’t say, 1 = 
I don’t believe it at all, 5 = I believe it completely). The internal consistency of the scale 
was α =.92. A composite score for trust in CAM was calculated for those who had 
reported an opinion on at least 5 treatments (95% of participants) by averaging the 
scores of items that had been given ratings between 1 and 5. 
Faith in intuition (Papers III and IV) was assessed using the FI scale of the Rational-
Experiential Inventory of Epstein and colleagues. In Paper III, the 5-item version 
(Epstein et al., 1996) was used and in Paper IV, the 20 item-version was used (Pacini & 
Epstein, 1999). The items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = fully disagree, 5 = fully 
agree). In Study 2 of Paper IV, the items were divided into subscales of Experiential 
Engagement, measuring the tendency to rely on intuitive judgments and enjoy making 
them (example item: “I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action”), 
and Experiential Ability, measuring the experience of one’s intuitive judgments being 
reliable (example item: “I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings 
to find an answer”). The reliability of the overall FI scale and the subscales ranged from 
.60 to .90.  
Need for cognition (Papers III and IV) was assessed using various versions of the 
NFC scale. In Paper III, the 5-item version of Epstein and colleagues (Epstein et al., 
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1996) was used. In Study 1 of Paper IV, the 18-item scale of Cacioppo and colleagues 
(1984) was used. Finally, Study 2 of Paper IV used 20 items from Pacini and Epstein 
(1999) that were divided into subscales on Rational Engagement, measuring reliance on 
analytical thinking and enjoyment of it (example item: “I enjoy solving problems that 
require hard thinking”), and Rational Ability, measuring trust in one’s ability to think 
rationally (example item: “I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions”). 
All the items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = fully disagree, 5 = fully agree). The 
reliabilities of the overall NFC scale and the subscales ranged from .75 to .91. 
Actively Open-Minded Thinking (Papers III and IV) was assessed using the AOT 
scale (Sá et al., 1999; Stanovich & West, 1997). The scale consists of 41 statements, 
such as, “I tend to classify people as either for me or against me” (reverse coded) and 
“Difficulties can usually be overcome by thinking about the problem, rather than 
through waiting for good fortune.” The items were rated on a 6-point scale (1 = disagree 
strongly, 6 = agree strongly). The reliability of the scale ranged from .81 to .84. 
The Argument Evaluation Test (Study 1 of Paper IV) was used to assess the ability to 
evaluate the quality of arguments independently of one’s own opinion, considered to be 
a measure of a tendency for reflective thinking. The test (Stanovich & West, 1997) 
proceeded in two parts. First, participants rated 23 statements on a 4-point scale (1 = 
strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree). The items mostly concerned societal topics, for 
example, “Women should stay home and take care of the children while they are 
young”. Later, after having completed several other tasks, participants read short 
dialogues about the same topics and evaluated the quality of the last argument in the 
dialogues on a 4-point scale (A = very weak, D = very strong). Some of the items were 
slightly modified to be more relevant for Finnish participants. In analyzing the AET, the 
participants’ ratings of argument quality were regressed simultaneously on their own 
opinions and on the ratings of a panel who were experts on judging argument quality, 
representing an objective standard. Fifty separate regression analyses were run, one for 
each participant. The beta coefficients of these regression equations served as the 
participants’ AET scores. 
Individual differences in the strength of cognitive inhibition (Study 1 of Paper IV) 
were assessed using a computerized color-word Stroop test. In the word reading 
condition (W), the names of 4 colors were displayed on a screen in black and the 
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participants were instructed to press a color-coded key depending on the word on the 
screen. In the color naming condition (C), the text ‘XXXX’ was shown in different 
colors and participants were instructed to press the corresponding key. In the color-word 
condition (CW), the names of the 4 colors were shown written in different colors and 
the participants were instructed to press the key that corresponded to the color of the 
font. Reaction times for correct trials were calculated and the Stroop interference score 
was calculated using Golden’s (1978) formula: CW − ((W × C)/(W + C)). 
Brain activations associated with supernatural thinking (Paper V) were assessed 
using a task that inquired about supernatural signs. The participants first read short 
stories (one to two sentences long) describing critical life situations, imagined 
themselves in the situations described, and then saw a picture paired with each story. An 
example item is: “You have been unemployed and have now finally gotten a job 
interview. You are unsure about how it went and are anxiously awaiting the decision,” 
followed by a picture of a business suit. In the Pilot study, the participants viewed 24 
story-picture pairs on a webpage and rated, on a 5-point scale, the extent to which they 
would think that each picture contained a sign or a message regarding how the situation 
was going to turn out.  
In the Main study 30 story–picture pairs, which were developed and selected on the 
basis of the pilot study and balanced with respect to emotional valence, were presented 
to participants on a small screen 20 cm from the participant’s face while they were 
undergoing fMRI. The blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) signal was 
recorded. This method provides a measure of how the blood flow in each part of the 
brain changes over time, indicating increases or decreases in brain activity in each area. 
The participants were shown each story for 7 seconds, then a picture for 5 seconds, 
followed by an 8-second pause showing a blank screen. Thus, the experiment used a 
block design with relatively short blocks, comparing activations between the story, 
picture and rest conditions.  
Five different activation effects in the fMRI signal were analyzed: (1) The overall 
effect on the whole brain of viewing the pictures as compared to the rest phases, (2) 
overall activation differences between skeptics and supernatural believers, (3) 
differences between skeptics and believers in an area in the right IFG that was chosen a 
priori as a region of interest (ROI), (4) differences between skeptics and believers in an 
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a priori ROI in the left IFG, and (5) whether the strength of activation of the right IFG 
ROI while the participants were viewing the pictures was related to their self-reported 
sign seeing.  
A self-report variable for seeing signs was also obtained. After leaving the fMRI 
scanner, the participants rated, on a 5-point scale, the same stories and pictures that they 
had viewed during the scan, on the extent to which they would think that each picture 
contained a sign or a message about how the situation was going to turn out. 
  
45 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Definitions  
The review of relevant literature from the last two decades on paranormal, superstitious, 
magical, and supernatural beliefs showed that seven main types of conceptual 
definitions have been used. The first five defined the beliefs in terms of domain-general 
characteristics: Most authors considered magical, superstitious, paranormal, or 
supernatural beliefs to be (1) false beliefs, and many defined this falsity as meaning (2) 
scientific impossibility. Three classes of definitions were variations on the theme of 
associative biases, defining the beliefs as building on (3) covariation bias, (4) the laws 
of sympathetic magic, and (5) irrational acts. The last two definitions appealed to 
domain-specific representations, and could be divided into (6) counterintuitive and (7) 
intuitive beliefs. 
The review revealed no solid reasons to separate the four concepts. First, 
operationalizations of paranormal, superstitious, magical, or supernatural beliefs were 
not systematically different from each other, as most of the beliefs were variously 
labeled using at least three of the concepts. Some small trends were nonetheless 
detected, such as a tendency to label luck-related beliefs as superstitions. However, 
these trends reflected the etymological histories of the concepts more than their 
theoretical underpinnings.  
Second, the domain-general definitions were found to be either too narrow to cover 
all relevant beliefs, or too broad to differentiate PSMS beliefs from other unfounded 
beliefs. For example, defining the beliefs as irrational acts excludes beliefs that allow 
the individual to be passive, such as beliefs in omens, astrology, and telepathy. 
Considering the beliefs to be the result of a covariation bias, in turn, does not 
encompass beliefs in single phenomena such as devils or an afterlife, and the laws of 
sympathetic magic are confined only to a subset of magical beliefs. Domain-specific 
definitions fared better in distinguishing PSMS beliefs from other unfounded beliefs, 
but still covering, we argued, all relevant beliefs.  
Out of the domain-specific definitions, the definition of supernatural beliefs as 
counterintuitive was found to be difficult to integrate with other work in developmental 
and cognitive psychology because of the different use of the term intuitive. Another 
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difficulty was that it is unclear whether the definition even covers beliefs, such as belief 
in a flying cow which, at face value, should not be defined as religious or supernatural. 
 
4.2 Core knowledge confusions  
The two studies in Paper II investigated the ability of core knowledge confusions to 
predict belief in the purpose of events and other PSMS beliefs. Both studies showed the 
same basic results. First, beliefs in the purpose of events were strongly related to the 
paranormal beliefs measured by the Revised Paranormal Beliefs Scale (Study 1: r = .62, 
p < .001, Study 2: r = .70, p < .001). Second, the results of multi-group structural 
equation modeling (SEM) revealed that in both datasets, a model in which core 
knowledge confusions were used to predict both types of beliefs had a good fit to the 
data (fit indexes for Study 1: χ2 = 53.17, df = 24, p < .01, GFI = .97, AGFI = .95, CFI = 
.98, RMSEA = .04, and Study 2: χ2 = 518.88, df = 55, p < .001, GFI = .97, AGFI = .95, 
CFI = .82, RMSEA = .06).  
In these models, a latent factor, which was named General Core Knowledge 
Confusion, accounted for a substantial portion of the variation in all core knowledge 
confusion scales (51–70% in Study 1, 29–59% in Study 2). This latent factor predicted 
much of the variation in latent factor General Paranormal Belief (33% and 49%). The 
General Paranormal Belief factor accounted for a majority of the variation in beliefs in 
the purpose of events (67% and 61%) and in paranormal beliefs (63% and 86%). In 
Study 1, the core knowledge confusions related to energy were the confusions with the 
strongest associations to the belief variables. In the SEM, these had a strong 
independent relation to the General paranormal belief factor over and beyond their 
loading on the General core knowledge confusion factor. In Study 2, when items used 
the word “force” instead of “energy,” and they were phrased similarly to all other 
confusion items, this independent relationship disappeared. Thus, the results from both 
studies in Paper II supported the hypotheses that beliefs in the purpose of events and the 
paranormal beliefs included in the RPBS overlap strongly, and that core knowledge 
confusions predict both types of beliefs.  
The two studies in Paper IV replicated the result that paranormal beliefs were 
positively related to core knowledge confusions. In Study 1, this relationship was 
weaker (r = .32) than in other studies, possibly due to the small number of items used to 
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assess the confusions. In Study 2, the relationship was at the expected level (r = .50), 
which was likely due to the improvements that were made to the ontological confusions 
measure. 
 
4.3 Core knowledge confusions involving energy among upper 
secondary school students  
On average, the upper secondary school students studied for Paper III accepted that 7.83 
out of a possible 41 ontologically confused statements on energy could be literally true. 
The most common type of confusion that the students accepted was a description of 
energy as a mental property. Indeed, approximately a third of the students considered 
energy something that can literally be good, mental, spiritual, and sensed as an 
experience. It was also relatively common for students to accept ideas that described 
energy with properties of a living thing that can grow, heal, poison, and wither. Less 
common conceptions concerned likening energy to an animate being that can see, hear, 
know, want and have subjective experiences.  
The pattern of accepting statements indicated that the ontologically confused 
conceptions seemed to co-exist with scientifically valid energy conceptions in the 
students’ minds. The majority of students (78%) correctly checked at least nine out of 
the eleven scientifically valid statements, and none of the confusions correlated with the 
scientifically valid conceptions, suggesting that a student could hold confused 
conceptions independently of scientific conceptions.  
Moreover, the data showed that the ontologically confused conceptions decreased 
during the physics courses. The students accepted fewer items describing energy with 
attributes of living things, animate beings and as a mental property at the end of their 
physics courses than they did at the beginning (repeated-measures ANOVA on the 
composite score of ontologically confused conceptions: F(1,90) = 22.77, p < .001, ηp2 = 
24). Their endorsement of scientifically valid descriptions, in contrast, did not change. 
No differences were found between the group that had attended the Targeted Lesson 
and those who had not, indicating that the Targeted Lesson did not have the expected 
effect on the students’ conceptions. Furthermore, no differences were detected between 
the course levels in the pretest energy conceptions. 
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Lastly, the ontologically confused conceptions of energy were related to trust in 
CAM. A more detailed inspection of the correlations reveals that this relationship was 
driven by the conceptions of energy as a mental property (r = .45, p < .001 at pretest, 
and r = .32, p < .05 at posttest). Conceptions of energy as a living thing or an animate 
being were, in turn, not significantly associated with trust in CAM. 
 
4.4 Intuitive, analytical, and reflective thinking  
The two studies in Paper IV demonstrated that paranormal beliefs were positively 
correlated with an intuitive thinking style and negatively with reflective thinking. In 
Study 1 of Paper IV, a stepwise regression analysis showed that paranormal beliefs 
were best predicted by the FI scale (β = .37, p < .01), and out of the analytical and 
reflective style measures (AOT, AET, NFC), only AOT significantly augmented the 
predictive power (β = −.43, p = .001, R2 change = .18).  
In Study 2 of Paper IV, analyses were run for both the overall FI and NFC scales and 
for the “ability” and “engagement” subscales suggested by Pacini and Epstein (1999). 
When FI and NFC were divided into these subscales, both of the engagement subscales 
were more strongly related to paranormal beliefs than their ability counterparts. 
Nevertheless, AOT was again superior to NFC in predicting paranormal beliefs. When 
using the overall scales, FI emerged as the best predictor of paranormal beliefs (β = .46, 
p < .001), and AOT added to the predictive power (β = −.34, p < .001, R2 change = .11) 
but NFC did not. When using the ability and engagement subscales, experiential 
engagement emerged as the best predictor (β = .46, p < .001), augmented by AOT (β = 
−.34, p < .001, R2 change = .12), but by neither of the NFC subscales. If core 
knowledge confusions were added to the independent variables, they surpassed all the 
thinking style variables in predicting paranormal beliefs (β = .50, p < .001). Study 2 of 
Paper IV also examined whether the relationships with the thinking styles were the 
same for all types of paranormal beliefs. The general pattern was predominately the 
same for all paranormal belief subscales.  
The correlations between the core knowledge confusions and thinking styles were 
also obtained. In Study 1 of Paper IV, these relationships were nonsignificant, possibly 
due to the small number of items. In Study 2, the relationships were similar to those for 
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paranormal beliefs, but weaker (r’s having a magnitude of .21–.46 for paranormal 
beliefs, and .14–.34 for core knowledge confusions).  
Among the younger students who were studied in Paper III, the relationships of their 
ontologically confused energy conceptions with the thinking style variables were 
weaker than might have been expected, but the trends were evident in the expected 
directions. In short, ontological confusions seemed to be negatively related to a 
disposition for actively open-minded thinking, and positively related to trust in intuition. 
However, these results need to be interpreted with caution because none of them met the 
confidence level which, due to the large number of correlations, was Bonferroni-
adjusted to .0006.  
The effect of encouraging intuitive responding by constraining the time allowed for 
responding was examined in Study 1 of Paper IV. The results were as expected. The 
number of ontological confusions accepted as literally true was significantly higher in 
the speeded than the unspeeded condition (F(1,49) = 50.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .51). 
Erroneous responses on the filler statements also increased somewhat in the speeded 
condition, but inspection of the effect sizes (ηp2), which were clearly smaller for the 
fillers (.09 and .07 for the two types of fillers), indicated that the increase in ontological 
confusions was not an artifact of a general disruption of reading or motor control, but a 
genuine effect of the speeded condition. 
 
4.5 Cognitive inhibition  
Study 1 of Paper IV examined the role of individual performance differences in 
cognitive inhibition. The results showed that paranormal beliefs were not significantly 
related to Stroop scores. In contrast and as expected, the core knowledge confusions 
correlated positively with the scores on the Stroop test (higher scores indicating poorer 
inhibition). In the speeded condition, this relationship was amplified (from r = .30 in the 
unspeeded condition to r = .51 in the speeded condition). A stepwise regression analysis 
predicting core knowledge confusions in the speeded condition showed that after 
accounting for Stroop scores (β = .51, p < .001), none of the thinking style measures 
(FI, NFC, AOT, AET) significantly added to the predictive power. 
In Paper V, prior to the fMRI study measuring the brain activations related to 
supernatural thinking, a pilot study was conducted to ensure the validity of the stimuli. 
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The  results of the Pilot study confirmed the prediction that seeing signs in story-picture 
pairs is indeed a form of supernatural thinking, with the two variables correlating 
strongly positively (r = 0.50, p < .001). The Main study then replicated this relationship 
between supernatural beliefs and seeing signs. The supernatural believers group 
reported seeing signs in the pictures approximately twice as often as the skeptics group 
did (M = 3.49 and M = 1.79, respectively; one-way ANOVA: F(1,21) = 25.92, p < .001, 
η2 = .56).  
The results of the fMRI analyses (Paper V, Main study) were as follows. First, the 
overall effect on the whole brain of viewing the pictures as compared to the rest phases 
(picture > rest contrast) was that activation increased in the left inferior frontal gyrus, 
middle frontal gyrus, fusiform gyrus, middle occipital gyrus and hippocampus. The 
reverse contrast (rest > picture) revealed no statistically significant activity. 
Second, the region previously associated with cognitive inhibition and therefore 
chosen a priori as a ROI, displayed the expected difference between paranormal 
believers and skeptics. Skeptics had a stronger activation than supernatural believers in 
the pars orbitalis and pars triangularis of the right IFG (Brodmann’s area (BA) 45/47; t 
= 5.34; MNI coordinates x = 52, y = 22, z = 0; p < .05, FWE-corrected for multiple 
comparisons).  
Third, overall differences between the groups were examined but no other group 
differences were found. Fourth, the expected group difference in the left IFG, chosen a 
priori as a ROI based on previous studies indicating it is associated with message 
interpretation, was not found. 
Fifth, in the pooled group of paranormal believers and skeptics, the ratings of seeing 
signs covaried with the average contrast strength in the picture > rest contrast in the 
right IFG ROI areas (BA 47; t = 4.73; MNI 36, 18, –10; p < .05, FWE-corrected for 
multiple comparisons). The stronger the activation was in these areas, the less the 
participants reported seeing signs, and vice versa. 
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5. Discussion 
 
5.1 Core knowledge confusions largely explain PSMS beliefs 
5.1.1 Conceptual support 
Paper I asked whether there is reason to conceptually separate the concepts of 
paranormal, superstitious, magical, and supernatural beliefs, or whether they can all be 
covered with the definition of confusions of the core properties of mental phenomena, 
material objects, living, and animate organisms, and the processes these engage in. The 
review found no solid reasons to separate the four concepts. As these concepts are used 
interchangeably and seem to denote the same beliefs, it is more parsimonious to use one 
definition to cover them all. However, the domain-general definitions were found to be 
either too narrow to cover all relevant beliefs, or too broad to differentiate PSMS beliefs 
from other unfounded beliefs.  
In accounting for all PSMS beliefs and only these beliefs, the two domain-specific 
definitions fared better. Thus, this thesis argues that the most relevant feature of the 
beliefs is not their form, but their content. As to whether the beliefs should be seen as 
counterintuitive or intuitive, the review noted the problems associated with the 
impreciseness of the concept of counterintuitiveness. In comparison, the definition of 
PSMS beliefs as intuitive is directly related to work on cognitive development and dual-
process theories of thinking and thus it is easier to test. However, we noted that 
intuitiveness is a domain-general concept and as such does not help in differentiating 
PSMS belief from other beliefs or intuitions. As PSMS beliefs may also transpire with 
much reflection and conscious thinking, the review advised against incorporating 
intuitiveness into the definition of PSMS beliefs (even though it may be an important 
part of the explanation for those beliefs). 
It was also noted that it is unclear whether the counterintuitiveness definition is too 
broad and covers ontological violations that by conventional standards should not be 
labeled as supernatural, such as a belief in a flying cow. Instead, we argued for the 
definition of all PSMS beliefs as category errors confusing core knowledge. This 
definition in effect incorporates many of the characteristics previously suggested to 
define the beliefs. For instance, the core knowledge confusion definition covers the 
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criterion that PSMS beliefs should be scientifically impossible, but it makes it more 
precise by excluding all of those beliefs that are as of yet unsupported, but not 
scientifically impossible. This definition is also more robust than the criterion that 
stipulates that paranormal statements should be empirically untestable. The reason is 
that testability might change with the development of research methods, but core 
knowledge confusions will remain category mistakes, and circumstances in which the 
arguments could be true do not exist. 
An important practical implication of the definition is that many phenomena that 
have been suggested to be paranormal are not paranormal after all. For example, belief 
in the existence of extraterrestrials and the belief that handwriting reveals one’s 
personality should not be classified as PSMS beliefs as they do not include category 
mistakes. 
Importantly, the proposed definition still covers a wide variety of PSMS beliefs. In 
addition, more specific concepts, such as animism, anthropomorphism, participation, 
nominal realism, thought-action fusion, artificialism, promiscuous teleological 
reasoning, and the magical laws of contagion and similarity, can all be interpreted as 
referring to a particular type of core knowledge confusion. 
 
5.1.2 Empirical support 
The three following papers empirically tested the prediction that core knowledge 
confusions that involve mental phenomena, material objects, living, and animate 
organisms, and the processes these engage in, are related to PSMS and to related beliefs. 
All papers supported this prediction. In Paper II, structural equation models of two large 
datasets showed that models in which core knowledge confusions predicted the 
tendency to hold paranormal beliefs fit the data well. In comparison to typical figures 
obtained in this field (reviews: Irwin, 2009; Vyse, 1997), the proportions of variance 
explained were large (33% and 49%). Study 2 of Paper IV provided a third independent 
large dataset that also showed that core knowledge confusions were strongly correlated 
with paranormal beliefs.  
Further, the core knowledge confusions also predicted supernatural beliefs that are 
not typically included in measures used to assess PSMS beliefs. In both studies in Paper 
II, the belief that random events occur for a purpose was explained by the same core 
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knowledge confusions as the other paranormal beliefs. In fact, the best fit to the data 
was obtained by a model in which beliefs in purpose and other paranormal beliefs 
formed part of the same latent general paranormal belief factor. As further support of 
the notion that all PSMS beliefs are part of the same psychological phenomenon, Study 
2 of Paper IV revealed that the pattern of correlations with core knowledge confusions 
and thinking styles was largely the same for all paranormal belief subscales. These 
findings are in contrast to the suggestion that different explanations might apply to 
different sets of beliefs. For example, the laws of sympathetic magic have been 
considered to explain a subset of beliefs that involve “essences,” but not other types of 
beliefs (Rozin et al., 1986; Rozin & Nemeroff, 2002). In light of the present findings, 
however, it seems that all PSMS beliefs can be explained by the same factors. 
Many scholars have advocated the view that supernatural beliefs, especially the 
belief in God or gods, are caused by an overextension of agency (Barrett, 2000; Bering, 
2006; Dein & Littlewood, 2011; E. M. Evans & Wellman, 2006; Gjersoe & Hood, 
2006; Guthrie, 1993). The results of this thesis expand on this idea to include not only 
overextension of agency, but also of the core attributes of physical and biological 
entities, as constituting the foundation of PSMS beliefs. As an illustration, many PSMS 
beliefs involve an overextension of the idea of “energy” or “force” to inappropriate 
domains. In Papers II and IV, the confusions expressing the idea of energies and forces 
that have mental and biological properties, such as knowing their direction and wanting 
to influence, were equally good if not better (Study 1 of Paper II) predictors of PSMS 
beliefs than the other confusions.   
As evidence of the importance of energy confusions in PSMS beliefs, Lindeman and 
Saher (2007) have reported that paranormal believers attribute biological processes such 
as wound healing to the operation of energy. Other researchers have noted that students’ 
conceptions of energy bear traces of vitalistic thinking (Barak, Gorodetsky, & Chipman, 
1997; Chabalengula et al., 2012), but Paper III was, to my knowledge, the first study 
that expressly investigated whether the energy conceptions found among a nonselect 
group of study participants are of the same type as those of paranormal believers. The 
results revealed that they were. Around a third of the students taking physics in three 
semi-randomly chosen upper secondary schools in Helsinki accepted that energy may 
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literally be good, mental, or spiritual. Many also conceived of energy as something that 
can grow, heal, or poison.  
As the idea of a healing, spiritual energy is central to many forms of complementary 
and alternative medicine, we expected to find the ontologically confused energy 
conceptions associated with trust in CAM. For the conceptions of energy as a mental 
property, this expected relationship was found. In other words, the study confirmed that 
the more one thought that energy can be, for example, mental, the more likely one was 
to believe in the efficacy of treatments that employ mental energy, such as in Reiki 
treatments. For the other ontologically confused conceptions, the expected relationship 
was not found. It is, however, possible that the correlations were deflated by the low 
level of CAM endorsement by this group of participants. Therefore, repeating the study 
among a population more interested in CAM might produce more easily interpretable 
results. 
Despite holding ontologically confused energy conceptions, all of the students also 
demonstrated that they were familiar with scientifically valid descriptions of energy. 
This finding is in line with previous studies that report that intuitive conceptions often 
co-exist in people’s minds with later-learned, scientific conceptions of the same topics 
(Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; Legare & Gelman, 2008; McCloskey et al., 1980; Shtulman 
& Valcarcel, 2012). By the present data, the ontologically confused energy conceptions 
do not seem to be highly robust. The students’ confusions did decrease during the 
course of the study, but the finding that there were no differences between the 
consecutive course levels in the pretest confusions calls the lastingness of this change 
into question. If taking physics courses led to deep changes in energy conceptions, we 
should expect to see fewer ontologically confused conceptions among those taking 
Physics 3 than among those taking Physics 1. However, this was not found. It also made 
no difference whether the students attended the lesson that explicitly addressed 
ontological categories – the students responded in the same manner as their peers who 
had not attended that lesson. Thus, ideas of spiritual and healing energies seem 
unresponsive to simple instructional interventions, such as the one used in this study. 
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5.2 Core knowledge confusions and PSMS beliefs arise from 
intuitive processing 
The finding that PSMS beliefs are associated with a preference for intuitive thinking is 
well known and has been replicated in several studies, using several different measures 
of intuition, and on a variety of beliefs (Epstein et al., 1996; Genovese, 2005; King et 
al., 2007; King & Hicks, 2009; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006; Sadler-Smith, 2011; 
Wolfradt et al., 1999). Both of the studies in Paper IV replicated this finding by 
demonstrating that out of a set of thinking styles, faith in intuition emerged as the best 
predictor of paranormal beliefs. Paper IV also showed that this relationship extended to 
core knowledge confusions. The relationships were similar as for PSMS beliefs, even 
though weaker.  
Why is reliance on intuition related to PSMS beliefs? The present experimental 
results support the idea that it is because PSMS beliefs emerge from intuitive 
processing. In Study 1 of Paper IV, people accepted more core knowledge confusions 
when instructed to respond quickly than when the response time was unlimited. This 
finding can be interpreted in light of the default-interventionist dual-process theories, 
which posit intuition as primary (J. St. B. T. Evans, 2010). As evidence for these 
theories, studies indicate that manipulations, such as limiting response time or 
burdening the reasoner with a secondary task, disrupt the ability of analytical processes 
to intervene with intuition (De Neys, 2006; J. St. B. T. Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005). 
In cases where two different representations of the same topic co-exist, these types of 
manipulations appear to bring out earlier-developing intuitive biases (Kahneman, 2003; 
Kelemen & Rosset, 2009). One might note the similarity of these results with the 
findings revealing that when not paying attention, even people with higher education in 
physics resort to intuitive mechanics biases that they normally suppress (McCloskey et 
al., 1980).  
Thus, the increase in core knowledge confusions in the speeded response condition 
supports the suggestion that core knowledge confusions are expressions of intuitive 
biases. Previous studies have demonstrated that manipulating thinking to be more 
intuitive increases teleological judgments (Kelemen & Rosset, 2009) and people’s 
assessments of their own belief in God (Shenhav et al., 2012). Study 1 of Paper IV 
indicates that the same effect applies more generally to PSMS beliefs, even increasing 
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agreement with statements such as “the Moon strives forward,” “A mind touches 
another mind,” and “Force aims to influence.” 
 
5.3 Reflective thinking restrains PSMS beliefs 
Even if PSMS beliefs originate in intuitive processing, this does not imply that 
analytical thinking does not play a part in determining who holds the beliefs and who 
does not. In fact, in the two studies in Paper IV, a tendency for reflective thinking 
accounted for a large proportion of the variance in the beliefs. On theoretical grounds, 
and based on studies using experimental manipulations (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012), 
this result was expected. Nevertheless, this represented a departure from previous 
studies on analytical thinking and PSMS beliefs, which have shown inconsistent or even 
contradictory findings (Epstein et al., 1996; Genovese, 2005; King et al., 2007; 
Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006; Sadler-Smith, 2011; Wolfradt et al., 1999; Yates & 
Chandler, 2000). A decisive difference, however, might be in the methods used to 
assess this type of thinking. Most of the previous studies operationalized analytical 
thinking as a need for cognition. In contrast, the present studies used methods that have 
been developed to tap into the reflective component of “Type 2” processing (Sá et al., 
1999; Stanovich & West, 1997).  
Earlier dual-process theories have not incorporated the distinction between 
algorithmic and reflective level “Type 2” processes. For example, Epstein’s cognitive-
experiential self-theory is a well-elaborated theory of intuitive-experiential and rational-
analytical ways of processing information, but it has discussed the rational-analytical 
“system” as a unitary entity (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Epstein et al., 1996). 
Therefore, it is possible that methods developed to fit the division into only two types of 
processing, such as the NFC scale (Cacioppo et al., 1984), do not capture individual 
differences at the reflective level. The scale developers themselves declare that NFC is 
not a measure of a tendency to think “rationally,” but rather a tendency to think 
extensively in general (Petty, Briñol, Loersch, & McCaslin, 2009).  
In contrast, the methods adopted in this thesis have been designed to capture the 
attitudes, motivations, values and epistemological goals (or “dispositions”; Stanovich, 
1999) that predict whether people will strive to use their analytical capacity to its fullest. 
As predicted, both of these measures, the AOT and the AET, were negatively related to 
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PSMS beliefs and to core knowledge confusions. Especially the AOT turned out to be 
strongly negatively related to the beliefs and was a better predictor of beliefs than NFC. 
Even among the upper secondary school students who were studied for Paper III, the 
AOT seemed to capture the essential dispositions that make people critical of 
phenomena such as CAM, but as the relationships were weak and nonsignificant, this 
finding must be taken as tentative.  
 
5.4 Cognitive inhibition correlates with skepticism 
Another way to look at the relationship of intuitive and analytical or reflective 
processing to PSMS beliefs is to analyze what enables one to restrain one’s intuitive 
biases. I propose that a key to understanding this interaction might be cognitive 
inhibition. First, Study 1 of Paper IV found that a better capacity to withhold 
inappropriate responses, as measured by the Stroop test (MacLeod, 2001, 2005), was 
related to accepting fewer core knowledge confusion statements. The speeded response 
condition accentuated this relationship to such an extent that after accounting for the 
Stroop scores, none of the thinking styles added to the predictive power. A notable 
finding is that the Stroop scores in this study were not related to PSMS beliefs. 
Previously, Stroop scores have been related to teleological biases in which natural 
phenomena are envisioned as existing to benefit each other, such as “mosses form 
around rocks to stop soil erosion” (Kelemen & Rosset, 2009). Taken together, these 
results may indicate that cognitive inhibition influences the intuitive biases that 
constitute the basis for PSMS beliefs more than it influences the knowingly held beliefs.  
Second, Paper V found that when presented with stories and pictures that may be 
interpreted as supernatural signs of what is to come, skeptics and paranormal believers 
differed in terms of their activation in a brain area that has been linked to cognitive 
inhibition. This area, BA 45/47 in the right IFG, has been linked to cognitive inhibition 
in studies using several different methods, and using tasks engaging both basic and 
higher cognition (Aron et al., 2004; De Neys et al., 2008; Tsujii & Watanabe, 2010). In 
the present data, the skeptics as a group had stronger activations in this area during the 
task than the believers did. As stronger support than can be obtained by looking at 
group differences, the activation in this area also covaried with the participants’ self-
assessments of how much they would think the stimulus materials contained 
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supernatural signs. To put it more simply, regardless of whether an individual was 
classified as a skeptic or as a believer, the more the area in question was activated, the 
less that individual thought that seeing a given picture would be an omen.  
However, as the present fMRI study included no direct assessments of cognitive 
inhibition, the conclusion that the right IFG activations reflected cognitive inhibition is 
based on a reverse inference from earlier studies linking this area to this cognitive 
process (Poldrack, 2006). It therefore comes with an inherent degree of uncertainty. To 
support the inference that skepticism involves inhibiting supernatural intuitions, the 
relationship between right IFG activation and skepticism towards supernatural signs 
should be replicated in studies that include converging behavioral measures of cognitive 
inhibition. 
 
5.5 Limitations of the study  
Some issues remain open for future studies. One issue is the need to further develop the 
core knowledge confusion statements and to develop a set of statements that most 
reliably and validly measures the biases they are designed to measure. Currently, the 
reliabilities of some of the core knowledge confusions subscales are poor. One possible 
reason for this poor reliability is that some of the items might not reflect intuitive biases 
as well as other items do. Therefore, more research is needed to particularize the content 
of the items and to improve the psychometric properties of these measures. Following 
the hypothesis that core knowledge confusions arise from intuitive processing, there is, 
in particular, a need for measures that can be used under speeded conditions and other 
conditions that may increase intuitive processing. 
Another issue for future research is to specify the conclusions that concern cognitive 
inhibition. At present, researchers disagree on whether inhibition should be 
conceptualized as an active process in which competing responses are inhibited, or 
whether the research findings can be interpreted with reference to other cognitive 
processes, such as working memory maintenance (Aron, 2007) or interference on 
response execution (MacLeod, Dodd, Sheard, Wilson, & Bibi, 2003). If the concept of 
cognitive inhibition is specified in more detail, our understanding of the processes 
behind PSMS beliefs may also increase.  
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Furthermore, the relationships between cognitive inhibition and the dual-process 
theories of reasoning are still understudied. The present findings indicate that both 
cognitive inhibition, as measured by the Stroop test (an algorithmic level process), and a 
reflective thinking style, as measured by the actively open-minded thinking scale and 
the argument evaluation test (reflective level processes) have complementary effects on 
restraining PSMS beliefs. Thus, the present results fit well with the model of the 
reasoning system advocated by Stanovich (1999, 2009a, 2009b), in which these two 
components of Type 2 thinking are distinguished. However, the division of different 
measures into these two levels, and the implications for PSMS beliefs that follow, must 
nevertheless be taken as preliminary, as the relationships of cognitive inhibition to dual-
process theories have not been firmly established. 
Moreover, conclusions based on the localization of brain activations must be 
interpreted with caution for a multitude of reasons. Localization efforts rest on the 
overall assumption that cognitive functions can be localized to discrete areas in the 
brain. It is, however, not clear that this assumption is valid, as large networks might be 
involved in producing each mental function (Logothesis, 2008). Even if the localization 
approach is substantiated, the right IFG might not be specific for cognitive inhibition. 
Some studies suggest that the right IFG might be related to attentional demands more 
generally and furthermore, that tasks requiring inhibition also activate many other areas 
besides the right IFG (Hampshire, Chamberlain, Monti, Duncan, & Owen, 2010). Thus, 
the reverse inference (Poldrack, 2006) that the right IFG activation of the skeptics in the 
present thesis specifically indicates a stronger cognitive inhibition, and not some other 
process (such as attentional demands), must be taken as tentative. To make this 
conclusion, the result must be substantiated by further studies that measure cognitive 
inhibition more directly.  
Similarly, the exact significance of the Stroop results must be clarified. The present 
results indicated that PSMS beliefs and core knowledge confusions decreased with 
stronger cognitive inhibition both as assessed by a Stroop test and as indicated by brain 
imaging. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the results obtained using these two 
different methods reflect the same underlying process. Imaging studies indicate that the 
neurocognitive basis of the Stroop effect overlaps with the right IFG region studied in 
the present thesis, but that it also includes several other frontal regions, such as the 
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anterior cingulate cortex, which is usually associated with conflict detection (Egner & 
Hirsch, 2005; Kerns, Cohen, MacDonald, Cho, Stenger, & Carter, 2004; Strauss, 
Sherman, & Spreen, 2006). Thus, our understanding of the specific executive functions 
involved in regulating PSMS beliefs may also become more nuanced along with further 
research. 
Concerning the representativeness of the present data, a large proportion of the 
participants in the present studies were university students, and all of the participants 
were Finnish. As Finnish university students are among the most skeptical populations 
used in studies on PSMS beliefs (Tobacyk & Pirttilä-Backman, 1992), the findings need 
to be further validated in populations with higher levels of belief, and in cultural 
environments that are more open to the supernatural. It is not likely that the 
relationships with the factors that we have found to be related to PSMS beliefs would 
not apply elsewhere. Rather, it is possible that other factors that were not examined in 
this thesis and that could not be detected among this population are also related to 
PSMS beliefs. These additional factors might provide interesting new insights into 
understanding these beliefs. 
 
5.6 Conclusion  
To sum up the present thesis, evidence was presented to support the assertion that 
PSMS beliefs can be defined as core knowledge confusions. These confusions predict 
both traditional paranormal beliefs, as well as beliefs not previously included in 
assessments of paranormal beliefs. These confusions are more common among people 
who prefer to trust their intuition and they are less common among those who strive for 
rational thinking. In addition, these confusions increase when analytical thinking is 
disrupted, and with less effective cognitive control of responses and thoughts. Lastly, 
they are found even in a nonselect group of upper secondary school students, and are 
not easily influenced by instruction. 
The present results indicate that PSMS beliefs are rooted in early-developing biases, 
but that there is large individual variation in how effectively a person’s reasoning 
system suppresses these biases. The picture that takes shape from these results is that 
perhaps people are universally prone to confuse core knowledge. For those whose 
cognitive inhibition is weaker, life is full of experiences and impressions that feel 
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wondrous: Stones and trees are no less animate than people are, and everything that 
happens to oneself, happens for a reason. Meanwhile, for others, strong cognitive 
inhibition prevents impressions such as these from reaching consciousness. Therefore, 
adopting paranormal, superstitious, magical, and supernatural beliefs that are available 
in one’s surrounding culture feels natural for others, while it feels foreign to others. 
Depending on one’s education and cultural environment, and one’s individual cognitive 
style, one might also replace these supernatural intuitions with non-supernatural 
explanations and adopt a non-supernatural worldview. Future studies will show whether 
a model such as this receives support. 
It is also possible that individual differences in inhibition explain the underlying 
causes as to why the intuitive and reflective styles are related to the beliefs. The present 
findings suggest that intuition is more easily accessible to people with weaker 
inhibition, and perhaps they therefore come to rely on it more. Conversely, people with 
stronger inhibition may find it easier to disregard their supernatural intuitions and to 
concentrate on examining them critically. 
If cognitive inhibition can explain individual differences in PSMS beliefs to the 
extent that the present thesis suggests, future studies may also investigate whether 
cognitive inhibition explains paranormal believers’ poorer performance on deductive 
reasoning tasks. Out of the domain-general “cognitive deficits” studied in relation to 
PSMS beliefs, deductive reasoning is the only type of task showing fairly consistently 
that PSMS believers are at a disadvantage (reviews: French & Wilson, 2007; Wiseman 
& Watt, 2006). As deductive reasoning tasks require reasoners to inhibit intuitive 
beliefs in favor of logical validity (De Neys & Franssens, 2009), and as success on these 
tasks activates the same brain area (De Neys et al., 2008; Goel & Dolan, 2003; Tsujii & 
Watanabe, 2010) that the present thesis found to be related to rejecting PSMS beliefs, 
the relationship of deduction with PSMS beliefs may turn out to be a consequence of the 
believers’ weaker ability to resist intuitions. 
Importantly, the present data concern individual differences in beliefs. By 
comparison, theories that assume PSMS beliefs to be universal neglect to address why 
many people do not hold these beliefs. The cognitive science of religion has also largely 
overlooked the question of individual differences and instead has discussed religious 
beliefs as if they were universal. In contrast, explaining the beliefs in terms of one’s 
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strength of cognitive inhibition and preferences for intuitive or reflective thinking leaves 
us in a better position to understand the intriguing question why some people adopt 
paranormal, superstitious, magical, and supernatural beliefs and others do not.  
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